The Effective Solution to insecurity in Nigeria
By Muhammad Bashar Mande
The root of Nigeria’s insecurity crisis lies in its porous borders. These uncontrolled entry points grant insurgents the freedom to move through Nigeria and across shared borders with Niger, Cameroon, and Benin virtually unchallenged. The immediate priority, therefore, must be a decisive reinforcement of border security, one robust enough that no militant force can breach or overwhelm it. This single action accomplishes two things at once: it cuts off the flow of new combatants into the country, and it traps those already inside, eliminating their escape routes.
The second course of action is to sever or reclaim their sources of revenue. These groups sustain themselves through the exploitation of gold mines and other resources they have seized by force. Strip them of this financial lifeline and you render them unable to fund their operations, pay their fighters, or sustain their campaign of violence.
Cornered and financially crippled, these groups will pivot to their most psychologically potent tactic: kidnapping civilians and holding them for ransom. Prevention is the superior strategy. Fortify the areas most vulnerable to abduction, particularly the rural communities that have historically borne the brunt of these raids. However, if hostages have already been taken, the position must be firm: do not yield to their demands. Concessions invariably serve the terrorists’ interests at the expense of the state’s. The only appropriate response is an aggressive rescue operation. Civilian lives lost in the course of such operations are a profound tragedy; their families must be honoured and generously compensated by the state. Above all, the government’s position must be made plain and irrevocable: it does not negotiate with terrorists.
Once all of the above has been implemented, these rebel groups will find themselves bankrupt, isolated, and broken. Cut off from external reinforcement, stripped of their income, and denied any sanctuary, they will have lost all meaningful capacity to fight. At this stage, they will attempt their final gambit: suing for peace. It is crucial that you do not accept any truce or ceasefire. These are groups defined by treachery: dishonourable, violent, and utterly without conscience. They keep no promises, respect no agreements, and will exploit any cessation of pressure to regroup and rearm.
Agreeing to a ceasefire is perhaps the most counterproductive decision a government can make at this stage. All the progress achieved will be swiftly undone. History is unambiguous on this point. In Sierra Leone, the government agreed to a ceasefire with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) on November 30, 1996, after months of relentless military pressure had brought the group to its knees. Less than a year later, the RUF had resumed its reign of terror. Angola tells a near-identical story: the government signed a truce with UNITA on November 20, 1994, and although a fragile peace held for a time, by 1998 the war had erupted again in full force. The pattern is consistent and the lesson is clear. Do not repeat it. If you intend to secure your nation and protect your citizens permanently, these groups must be completely and publicly defeated, their capacity to fight destroyed beyond recovery. Do not fear employing every strategic advantage at your disposal; history will not judge the methods, only the outcome.